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Abstract
This paper presents two models that exemplify psychological factors
as a determinant and as a consequence of social network characteristics.
There is an endogeneity considered in network formation: while the social
experiences have impacts on people, their current psychological states and
traits affect network evolution. The first model is an agent-based model
over Bianconi-Barabasi networks, used to explain the relation between
network size, extroversion, and age of individuals. The second model
deals with the emergence of urban tribes as a consequence of a smaller
propensity to communicate with different with different traits and opin-
ions.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a strong upsurge in the study of identity as a
variable, built up on different types of individuals’ representation, also known as
identity traits [20], dipped in a social logic with values and customs of the time.
According to Social Comparison Process Theory [17], people unconsciously com-
pare themselves with the ones who are similar to them, and this behaviour boosts
social networking, thus contributing to life in society.
Natural phenomena can be usefully described in network terms. Sociologists
have perceived the usefulness of this approach and several applications were
developed [19, 6]. However, there is a link between behavioural sciences and the
sociological realm lacking in the complex synthetic networks literature.
Some models are very successful in modeling real social networks [23]. Some
factual characteristics like the higher probability of meeting a friend of a friend
than a complete unknown were observed and realistic networks emerged. This
is in the sociological realm. Not to consider behavioural questions is not a flaw
as they would not increase the explanatory power of the macro level as they
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would increase the complexity of the model. However, some questions about
the nature of the agents are not noticed in this perspective.
On the other hand, sociophysics are an important stream of research in
quantitative methods for sociology [18, 31] and can be used to understand this.
Through simple rules, such as the ones used in the Sznadj Model [34] and
Kynetic Exchange Opinion Models [25], real phenomena isolating important
characteristics are explained. Within this reseach area, variations dealing with
extremism or contrariness [27, 12] represent a movement towards a more plau-
sible modeling from a psychological perspective. For instance, [27] presents a
model with the intransigence of an agent being endogenous.
This trend represents an important theoretical step. Past empirical research
has shown that the location of a person in a social network can predict person-
ality traits of big-five factors [10]. On the other hand, there is evidence that the
psychological traits of agents may affect how their networks is [33], showing some
endogeneity. Applications acknowledging this direction are fruitful in political
science and migrations [26, 29]. In management, it was shown that narcissism
can play a strong role on a CEO’s decision making, in a sense that higher levels
of narcissism leads to weaker inclination for following past directors’ strategies
[9, 37].
In this paper, we propose to fill this gap through a theoretical sociophysics
model that considers the endogeneity between node preferences and traits —
the fitness of a node in Bianconi-Barabasi networks [5] — and the structure of
the network. Two models incorporating this idea are developed. First, a simple
reinforcement learning paradigm affects the “social expertise” of the agent over
a network and this affects how this network is developed. An application to the
results presented at [30] is presented.
The second model deals with the emergence of urban tribes as a function of
the willingness to communicate with different persons — modeled as a bounded
confidence model [22, 14] — and the decay of the social relations. These pa-
rameters can explain the number of groups that emerge over time and in the
stability of groups over time. This is useful to illustrate the sociological and
microeconomic literature on identity and behavior [2].
This model may be compared with Axelrod culture model [3]. In this previ-
ous model, the diffusion of culture is ran over a static structure with the culture
being discussed over it. In one hand, Axelrod model is appropriate to real sit-
uations where it is not possible not to isolate people easily. However, in social
networks based on individuals, like online social networks, it is easier to avoid
unwanted people and reconfigure the edges structure. This leads to groups that
interact, but not necessarily have the same opinion, and usually
In the second section the reinforcement model is developed and discussed.
The third section introduces the urban tribes model. Finally, some remarks
about the models are made and the conclusion is presented.
2 Baseline Model
Reinforcement learning is an important tool for cognitive architectures [35],
modeling habits [21] and solving games [16]. To model the behavior of an agent
over a complex network, it is important to consider that her aptitude to create
contacts or to keep relations is a function of some psychological states that may
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be reinforced.
In a simple example, some would expect that social stigma would lead to
low self-esteem. This relation is attenuated by the usage of in-group support to
reinforce the self-esteem of the members [11]. However, there is strong evidence
that minorities suffer from effects that majorities do not [28]. The possibility of
suffering bad experiences must be considered in this reinforcement model.
Bianconi-Barabasi networks [5] are important in this context as they have
a fitness parameter for each node that in social contexts may represent the
presence of a socially valuable characteristic. However, to only consider a fixed
fitness is not related to the reinforcement learning paradigm. An alternative is
to update the fitness following some pleasant experiences, rewarding the agents
that participated of the experience.
The experiences are inspired in a Kinetic Exchange Opinion Model [25]
paradigm: randomly an edge between two agents is selected and the partic-
ipants of it have a fitness increase after a round of interactions. The fitness
function may be variable. In this initial model, it is a realization of an Bernoulli
distribution: with probability p it is positive and with possibility 1 − p it is
negative. The cases tested were p = 1 and p = 0.5.
Another question which is important in this initial model is the structure
between sample size, time periods and interactions per time period. The smaller
the sample size to interactions ratio, the less the agents — independently of
fitness — are inexperienced. The time period, in this case, it is just a measure
without much interpretation besides regulating the learning of the agents. What
is really important for the agents is this ratio that may be understood as the
age of the agents.
Algorithm 2.1: Network1(SampleSize, Shocks, T ime)
Fitness← ones(SampleSize)
for i← 1 to Time
do

Network ← Barabasi-Bianconi(fitness)
Experience = zeros(SampleSize)
for j ← 1 to Shocks
do
Select randomly an edge(a, b)Experience(a) = Experience(a) + reward
Experience(b) = Experience(b) + reward
F itness← Fitness+ Experience
return (Fitness)
The algorithm for this model is presented in Algorithm 2.1. It details how
the baseline model simulations are performed. The results of simulating this
process a thousand times considering the initial fitness an 1xN unit vector,
with a reward of 0.05 can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1 presents two simulations that have different characteristics. The
first simulations varies the “sample size to interactions” ratio. The main result
considering this variation is that the higher the “size to interactions” ratio, the
smaller the average fit. If we keep this ratio fixed, the average fitness is similar
for all the sample sizes. However, the average ratio between the maximum
individual fitness and the median individual fitness is higher for large samples.
The maximum to minimum ratio, the maximum to median ratio and average
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Figure 1: The simulations with initial fitness equal to 1 and rewards fixed and
equal to 0.05. The fixed number of shocks leads to distortions in the mean of
the fitness. The higher the “size to interactions” ratio, the smaller the average
fit. In a fixed “size to interactions”, the higher the sample size; the higher the
distance from the maximum individual fitness to the median fitness.
Iterations Sample to Interactions
Sample Size N=50 N=100 N=200 N=400 N=50 N=100 N=200 N=400
Average Fit 2.7232 1.9266 1.4810 1.2452 1.9347 1.9266 1.9227 1.9205
0.0130 0.0055 0.0021 0.0008 0.0073 0.0052 0.0039 0.0026
Maximum to Median 1.5204 1.5787 1.5493 1.4596 1.5233 1.5795 1.6337 1.6932
0.0870 0.0984 0.0940 0.0876 0.1069 0.0980 0.0944 0.0915
Maximum to Minimum 2.2553 2.3090 2.1124 1.7942 2.1671 2.3072 2.4554 2.6114
0.1989 0.1908 0.1462 0.0958 0.1948 0.1871 0.1815 0.1734
Table 1: Means and standard deviations for the simulations presented in Figure
1. It is important to perceive that considering the sample size to interactions
ratio fixed, the average ratios between the largest individual fitness and the
other metrics are larger.
fitness are in table 1. The averages and standard deviations for a thousand
simulations are exhibited and confirmed in the results from figure 1.
The results exhibited here are valid in a context where the payoffs of an
interaction are positive. However, in real life there are little cases where all the
interactions within a group are positive and some social interactions may result
in clashes between individuals. The model adapts itself to this fact by changing
p to a probabilistic case.
Setting p = 0.5, the results are present in figure 2. In these simulations the
fitness of an agent is never below 0. This figure shows that the fixed number of
shocks does not create a distortion with different averages for different samples
sizes this time. With probabilistic rewards, a higher “size to interactions” ratio
leads to a higher maximum individual fitness to the median fitness as well a
high sample size. Table 2 condenses this information.
In table 2, is possible to see that for a high sample size to interactions ratio
— including the one fixed — there are some maximum to minimum ratios that
are non-estimated due to non defined elements. Considering only the maximum
to median ratio, the effect is similar to the observed in table 1 for the “Sample
to Interactions” parameters.
While this model is not very complex, it can give some insights. For in-
stance, table 1 is useful when analysed with the results of [30]. In Roberts et al.
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Figure 2: Simulations with initial fitness equal to 1 and rewards fixed and
equal to 0.05 and varying rewards. The fixed number of shocks does not lead
to different averages for different samples sizes this time. However, a higher
“size to interactions” ratio leads to a higher maximum individual fitness to the
median fitness. Considering this ratio fixed, the higher the sample size, the
higher the distance from the maximum individual fitness to the median fitness.
Iterations Sample to Interactions
Sample Size N=50 N=100 N=200 N=400 N=50 N=100 N=200 N=400
Average Fit 1.0060 0.9969 0.9963 1.0003 0.9970 0.9981 0.9991 0.9996
0.1708 0.0942 0.0492 0.0246 0.0987 0.0917 0.0927 0.0934
Maximum to Median 1.5488 1.5050 1.4232 1.3498 1.4573 1.5009 1.5508 1.5936
0.1558 0.1056 0.0773 0.0600 0.1155 0.0994 0.0961 0.0935
Maximum to Minimum - - 2.5880 2.0972 - - - -
- - 0.6433 0.2405 - - - -
Table 2: Means and standard deviations for the simulations presented in Figure
2. The maximum to minimum ratio was not considered for some cases due to
null individual fitness cases. Considering the maximum to median ratio, the
effect is similar to the observed in table 1 for the “Sample to Interactions”
parameters.
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paper, both network size and age are correlated with Extroversion (measured by
psychometric scales). When the authors considered age as a variable to explain
network size, the significance of extroversion was vanished. In line, our results
show that more interactions — small sample size to interaction ratio — lead
to higher means in the traits. In other words, there is a correlation between
number of interactions and trait, but trait itself is built over accumulation of
interactions.
3 Tribes and Communications in Networks
Previous models have not yet analysed the memory of the networks. We consider
that, for each iteration of the algorithm, the network is restated. In other words
our model considers a set of nodes shared across the time instead of a temporal
network. Moreover, the algorithm implicitly assumes a pool of acquaintances,
in which active relations are developed each turn. In sum, although our model
still provides understandings about how psycho-social characteristics and syn-
thetic network characteristics may be linked, it is not fully developed as a valid
network.
An alternative is based on the rewiring of a graph [36]. Each time period, an
edge ab has the probability q of being rewired. This technique, however, yields
two questions: 1) how to calculate q (or must it be a constant?); 2) how to keep
preferential attachment and realistic assumptions about connections?
In social psychology and social network research, there is a tendency to
model less contacts with a decay on relationships that are not activated [7, 8].
This must be incorporated by the model: the passage of time leads to higher
probability of forgetting.
However, in some sense, forgetting may be realistic if in a situation of
rewiring the agent forgot a very similar friend by chance. This agent will possi-
bly be missed, then a re-connection with a higher level of connection is plausible.
If this peer is not close to you in the themes you like, then you may rewire to
another person. Therefore, the mechanism to answer (1) is the same that is
necessary for (2).
A mechanism of decay for q is to consider:
q∗t = α
1−nqt−1 (1)
where n is the number of successful interactions. To this equation become q(t),
it is necessary to truncate values larger than zero. If the agent forgets an edge,
then it must select a new (or the same) peer that now is a contact with qt+1 = 1.
The preference for a new partner is a function of the difference between fitness:
wij =
1
1 + |fitnessi − fitnessj | ,∀j ∈ S (2)
rij = wij#Edgesj (3)
where S is the agent space and the selection of a new partner follows a Bianconi-
Barabasi preferential attachment using wij instead of the fitness.
The concept of successful interaction used is based in the bounded confidence
with threshold . Given an agent a in an interaction with another agent b, the
fitness is updated following:
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fitnessat =

fitnessat−1 + fitnessbt−1
2
if |fitnessat−1 + fitnessbt−1| ≤ 
fitnessat−1 else
(4)
Synthesizing the model, the algorithm for this network is in Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1: Network2(SampleSize, Shocks, T ime,Alpha,Epsilon)
Fitness← randn(SampleSize)
Network ← Barabasi-Bianconi(ones(SampleSize))
q = ones(SampleSize)
for i← 1 to Time
do for j ← 1 to Shocks
do
{
Select randomly an edge(a, b)
Update edges fitnessa and fitnessb according to equation 4.
Update q following equation 1.
Dead← q < RandomVector(SampleSize)
for j = 1 to SampleSize ∈ Dead = 1
do
{
Rewire according to equation 3.
qj = 1
return (Fitness)
This algorithm generates networks that have as a property a control over the
number of groups that appear after some interactions. More clearly: variations
of  lead to an ambient with more or less groups defined. In sociological terms,
low disposition to talk with different persons implies in more stable groups that
do not connect and convince each other about similar topics (leading to non-
unanimity).
Another consequence of low  is the reduced number of relations that are
durable. The agents frequently peer contacts that are not similar as they want,
therefore q decay frequently. This is exhibited in figure 3, simulated with Sample
Size equals to 80, number of shocks fixed at 10, α = 0.9 and initial fitness
generated from a standard normal distribution. This is robust to variations of
α.
It is interesting to notice that this may be related to polarisation on so-
cial networks. The easiness to ignore or unfollow other people may reduce the
tolerance to some debates. Imagining the relations between fitness as a social
distance parameter [1], some people may have less desire for a given element of
that group. A slightly smaller fitness may isolate them from more radical people
and so on, progressively. Some graphs generated by this algorithm are displayed
in figure 4a and figure 4b using a population of 40 nodes. Other parameters
were set as 20 shocks per turn as α = 0.99, so the death of nodes is relatively
rare. Even in this case, the graph be broke in two non-connecting networks.
This phenomena is due to the propensity of connecting to people that has
similar opinions — fitness — over the out-group. This can be analysed by
changing equation 2:
wij =
{
1 if |fitnessi − fitnessj | < 
a else
(2b)
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Figure 3: In the upper image, the boxplot exhibits the number of groups defined
by different fitness in the network according to the epsilon. The lower image, the
boxplot exhibits the average number of edges dying per period. The simulations
where performed with a population of 80 edges, 10 shocks per period, α = 0.99
and initial fitness drawn from a standard normal. The size of  is strongly
determinant on both measures.
The parameter a controls the relative strength of the in-group over the out-
group. In our simulations it was set equal to 0.01. Some graphs generated using
this variation are shown in figure 4c and figure 4d, with the same parameters
used in figure 4a and 4b.
The literature on communication indicates more polarization over time based
on networks and alternative media [15]. This model may be used to explain this
phenomena. Social niches are built, but people do not communicate with other
the way they need to produce stability. This is analogous to what is called liquid
modernity [4], but developed in a simpler way by adding equations and taking
out a lot of words.
4 Conclusion
Social networks are an important topic of research. Much is explored in opinion
diffusion about imposing communications over networks, but little is done on
how communication affects networks. In this paper, this gap is explored and two
models which have direct applications on sociological and psychological topics
are developed.
The evidence about extroversion being not sufficiently strong to explain so-
cial network size when considering age [30] may be studied in the first model.
In this analysis, the number of interactions, or age, is determinant for both
extroversion and network size.
The second model deals with the possibility of some networks being able to
adapt and break the formation of large groups because of individual low dispo-
sition to communication. This is not a novelty in the sense bounded confidence
models [22] already displayed some similar properties. However, to study com-
munication over a static network ignores the stability of groups as dependent of
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(a)  = 0.5 and using Eq. 2a
(b)  = 1.5 and using Eq. 2a
(c)  = 0.5 and using Eq. 2b
(d)  = 1.5 and using Eq. 2b
Figure 4: Some sample graphs generated using the algorithm proposed. There
are an interaction of  and the relative power of in-group and out-group to
isolate tribes as can be seen comparing image 4a-4b and 4c-4d.
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the willingness to communicate. The new model illustrate this with applications
to group dynamics.
Finally, future research in the quantitative stream may include analyse the
impact of psychological profiles, such a tendency to be an extremist [13] and
emotions [32], and the structural consequences of individual random shocks
on agents’ fitness. Other interesting topic is to generalize the base network
model from a Barabasi-Bianconi network to a more general weighted growth or
multicomponent graph model [24].
From a sociological and psychological perspective, to understand the de-
terminants of  across societies and groups is fundamental to comprehend the
dynamics of social networks. In political terms, to articulate networks to a com-
prehensive framework of collective action to explain real phenomena is the next
step.
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